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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Theories of learning have been the backbone of 
psychological research and theory construction since 
psychology's scientific beginnings. An understanding of how 
human beings learn is fundamental to understanding human 
beings at all. From the 1930s through the 1950s, perhaps 
the heyday of learning theory development and research, 
psychologists endeavored to create "global" or "grand" 
theories that could explain all aspects of the learning 
process. Skeptical that any one theory could explain 
completely the nature of the learning process, psychologists 
since the 1960s have tended to focus on specific aspects of 
the learning process. Behavioristic theories such as 
classical conditioning or reinforcement theories, as well as 
the numerous cognitive theories, have each at one time or 
another enjoyed a considerable amount of empirical 
attention. Currently, even while various cognitive theories 
continue to develop, the more traditional behavioristic 
theories are enjoying a comeback in psychological research 
(Klein and Mowrer, 1989). 
A careful reading of both past and present theories of 
learning reveals that most of them assume a mediation model 
of cognition in which various cognitive mechanisms mediate 
between environmental stimuli and behavioral responses. In 
1 
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this thesis, however, we would like to put forth a theory of 
learning, perhaps in the spirit of grand theories, that 
derives from a predicational (after Rychlak, l988b) model of 
cognition rather than a mediational model. A predicational 
model of learning is an alternative theoretical explanation 
based on the assumption that people as agents actively endow 
their world with meaning. The predicational process of 
learning is neither mechanistic nor mediated; it is a 
process that requires an active (as opposed to passive) 
contribution on the part of an individual in order for 
learning to take place. The fundamental nature of the 
predicational process is dialectical. That is, learning is 
process by which meanings are grasped in terms of, at the 
vary least, their opposites. Opposites provide clarity and 
a delimitating context within which the contents of the 
predicational process can be framed. This is by no means 
the only way in which dialectics has been understood. The 
term "dialectical'' has a long philosophical history, with 
many different meanings. For the purposes of this thesis we 
will ref er to the dialectical aspect of the predicational 
process as oppositionality. 
To be sure, there is a growing body of research that 
suggests that there is a dialectical or oppositional feature 
to cognition. In Chapter I of this thesis, we will provide 
a theoretical backdrop from which to understand the current 
research on oppositionality--itself a form of the 
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predicational process. Chapter II will include a review of 
past research that shows oppositionality to be an important 
aspect of the learning process. The primary purpose of this 
thesis is to add to that body of research by reporting on 
three experiments that were designed to demonstrate the 
importance of oppositionality during learning. 
Specifically, the experiments conducted for this thesis were 
designed to investigate directly a) the extent to which 
oppositional meanings are salient in learning and memory 
tasks, and b) whether oppositional meanings (as opposed to 
non-oppositional meanings) can actually enhance learning and 
memory abilities. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF OPPOSITIONALITY 
In this chapter the theoretical foundations for the 
research reported in this thesis are laid down. A brief 
discussion of importance of theory in research is followed 
by an discussion of Logical Learning Theory (LLT) , the 
theory of interest. The final pages of this chapter define 
and explicate--via dialectical meaning--the particular 
theoretical construct of interest within this theory: 
oppositionality. 
Theor_y 
For the past forty years or so, historians and 
philosophers of science have reminded us of the preeminent 
role that theory plays in scientific inquiry (e.g., Kuhn, 
1970; Popper, 1959; Marx, 1951). Theories, whether formal 
or informal, give expression to any given fact pattern. The 
positivistic notion that the "facts speak for themselves," 
that they are somehow independent of theory, has given way 
to a more modest notion that for any given fact pattern 
there are, in principle, an infinite number of explanations. 
Even more fundamental than simply recognizing that the same 
fact pattern may have multiple interpretations is the 
realization that in order for facts to be facts at all--that 
is, facts for a community of scientists--they need a 
4 
language of description, and any given language necessarily 
carries with it implicit (if not explicit) assumptive 
5 
categories. Since assumptions are inextricably joined to 
theory, at one level or another, it follows that articulated 
facts are theory-laden. Moreover, contemporary criticism of 
scientism1 reminds us that observations, from which facts 
are derived, are themselves theory-laden, dependent upon the 
pre-understanding (or assumptions or framework) of the 
observer. This becomes a critical point as scientists 
construct a body of scientific knowledge. Understanding the 
pre-understanding or assumptive framework of the observer 
(or scientist) becomes a crucial factor in understanding a 
body of empirical research that is being offered up by an 
observer or a community of observers. 
Given these assertions about the importance of theory, 
those who hold to such assertions would see theory 
construction, explication and criticism as perhaps the most 
crucial tasks of the scientist. 2 On this account the 
1-According to Bleicher (1982, p.14) the term "scientism" 
refers to a particular brand of science that includes the 
following tenets: 
a) science deals with "facts" given independently of the 
researcher 
b) the empirical-analytical method is the only valid mode of 
knowledge-acquisition: 
c) that this method should be extended to all spheres of 
cognitive activity 
d) that its results are the only true form of knowledge 
2-Recently there is has been call for psychologists to 
take the task of theory construction and criticism in a 
rigorous way (see Kukla, 1989). 
ubiquitous aphorism usually attributed to Kurt Lewin that 
"there is nothing so practical as a good theory" might be 
better stated as ''there is nothing so essential as good 
theory." Nevertheless, while these epistemological 
considerations are crucially fundamental 3 , theory qua 
theory continues to play an important practical role in 
scientific inquiry. 
Rychlak (1981, Chapter III), for example, has 
6 
considered the role of theory in psychology and has outlined 
four general functions: First, theory serves a descriptive 
function in that it gives an accounting of the nature of 
human phenomena (p.45). This function brings together 
statements, categories, or propositional relationships that 
describe, at one level of abstraction or another, the sum 
total of a given phenomenon or phenomena. Theoretical 
descriptions make explicit the pre-understanding or 
assumptive categories of theorists. Theory also functions 
to delimit or set bounds on the scope of constructs or 
propositions (p.49). Delimiting theoretical constructs or 
propositions allows for theories to be cogent, meaningful 
and explanatorily powerful. Without this delimiting 
3-obviously, epistemological considerations of science, 
knowledge and observation are the stuff whole theses and books 
are made of. It is not my intention to go into any further 
detail concerning this important area. For detailed analysis 
of these issues see Bleicher (1982), Faulconer and Williams 
(1985), Feyerabend (1975), Kuhn (1970), Lakatos and Musgrave 
(1970), Manicus and Secord (1983) Polkinghorne (1983); Rychlak 
(1985), Shames (1990) and Suppe (1977). 
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function theoretical constructs or propositions can address 
many different phenomena but the relationship between them 
will be conflated or unclear. Theories that delimit are 
able to escape the philosophical truism that "that which 
explains everything explains nothing." Theory also serves a 
generative function in providing the germ from which further 
thought and research can be nourished (p.54). Theory should 
be used as a heuristic that generates insights, speculation 
or explanation about the nature of a given phenomenon. 
Finally, as implied in the other functions, theory serves an 
integrative function (p.65); it brings together theoretical 
constructs into a consistent unified whole. At the very 
least, formal theories should reflect this integrative 
quality. 
It might be maintained that a good theory should 
reflect all four of these functions. Even while it can be 
argued that theories which may be lacking in one or more of 
these functions are still good theories, the four functions 
do serve as a useful framework from which to examine the 
merits of a given theory. Moreover, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that the staying power of a theory may depend on its 
ability to carry out these fundamental functions. 
The present research for this thesis is directly tied 
to a theory. Given the preceding discussion about the 
importance and function of theory, what follows will include 
a brief explication of the theory of interest--via this 
chapter and a literature review--as well as a presentation 
of empirical findings designed to investigate important 
constructs contained within the theory. 
Logical Learning Theory 
8 
Rychlak's (1988) "Logical Learning Theory" (LLT) serves 
as the rationale for the research reported on in this 
thesis. It is a teleological, humanistic approach to human 
phenomena. According to this theory, individuals as agents 
are capable of making a contribution to their own cognitions 
and behaviors. That is, human beings are able to act "for 
the sake of which," instead of merely being acted upon by 
external or internal (biological) forces. Human freedom or 
agency is a fundamental concern of LLT (Rychlak, 1988, 
1981) . 
Since there are many definitions of and perspectives 
about freedom or agency which are in constant state of flux, 
and since any discussion of freedom can become easily 
conflated, it is important to be explicit about the kind of 
freedom LLT seeks to address. Logical learning theory is 
not concerned with physical or political freedom. Often 
questions of political liberty and rights or physical 
confinement in one form or another are confused with what 
has been called freedom of the will or agency. It is the 
latter concept that LLT concerns itself with. Logical 
learning theory is strictly a psychological theory, 
concerning itself with such psychological processes as 
wishes, decisions, intentions, desires, motivations and 
individual responsibility for such cognitive processes. 4 
At first glance, theories that concern themselves with 
human agency seem neither original nor productive given the 
9 
long-standing, notoriously complicated debates that span the 
philosophical history of Western civilization. Moreover, 
because of the reductio-mechanistic tendencies of modern 
psychological inquiry, the notion of agency is usually 
ignored, lost, or denied. 5 By and large, most theories of 
human behavior are deterministic in the same sense that 
Newtonian physics is deterministic. Indeed, most models of 
human behavior are, by now in an "unconscious" way, 
patterned after the model of a superseded physics (Leahey, 
1987, pp.3-33; Polkinghorne, 1983, Chapter 2; Robinson, 
1981, Chapters 10 & 11; Rychlak, 1979, Chapter 2, 1981, 
Chapter V) . Since efficient-cause forces rather than 
freedom are the central concern of psychology, the question 
of human beings qua agents is either assumed, ignored or 
4-see Thorp (1980, pp.3-16) for a brief but informative 
explication of the varieties of psychological freedom. For a 
more detailed analysis and critique of psychological freedom 
as defined here, see Strawson (1986). 
5 -For example, Skinner (1971) suggests that "man's 
struggle for freedom in not due to a will to be free, but to 
certain behavioral processes characteristic of the human 
organism, the chief effect of which is the avoidance of or 
escape from so-called aversive features of the environment 
(p.42) ." Our "feeling" free is an illusion because, 
ultimately, "freedom is a matter of contingencies of 
reinforcement ... " (p. 37). 
10 
thought to be too theoretically and methodologically messy. 
But as some psychologists have argued (e.g., Gauld and 
shotter, 1979; Rychlak, 1988, 1979; Taylor, 1985; Williams, 
1987), unless psychology can account for human activity in 
terms of agency, in terms of genuine (not simply apparent) 
possibility and responsibility, human activity in all of its 
variety will necessarily lose any semblance of 
meaningfulness. As Williams (1987, p.211) has argued, the 
meaningfulness of human action resides "in its possibilities 
and its alternatives, its meaningful network of ends and 
distinctions.'' To borrow an example from Williams, an act 
of love is meaningful if it is distinguished from acts of 
hate, envy or mistrust and if it is understood that it need 
not happen. 
Meaningful acts are meaningful because an actor could 
have acted differently or not acted at all. If acts of love 
or hate or a variety of other human activities were to be 
understood fundamentally as efficiently caused necessity, 
those acts could only be understood as unintelligible and 
therefore absurd; and any semblance of meaningfulness 
attached to such acts must be viewed as illusory. Since as 
psychologists and human beings we take our actions and the 
actions of others to be meaningful, it in incumbent upon us 
to explain and understand human behavior as essentially 
meaningful. But while human freedom may be theoretically 
and methodologically difficult, scientific method and 
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inquiry should and can contribute to ongoing dialogue about 
human freedom. This has been precisely Rychlak's point: 
Human agency need not and should not evade empirical rigor. 
To account for human agency LLT utilizes Aristotle's 
well known notion of the four causes: material, efficient, 
formal and final. The material cause refers to the 
substance from which something is made. If we are trying to 
demonstrate the causes of chair, to use the classic example, 
the wood used to build a chair would be the material cause. 
The efficient cause refers to the forces or "energy" by 
which something is made. In the case of our chair, it would 
be the physical effort expended in putting the chair 
together. The formal cause refers to the "form" or 
"blueprint" belonging to the item being brought about. In 
order for the chair to be made, some idea about what a chair 
looks like--its "chairness"--must be known. The final cause 
refers to the intention or "that for the sake of which" 
something is brought about. The chair was made with the 
intention of being used to sit on (among other things). As 
might be noticed, Aristotle's notion of cause is much 
broader than current notions of cause--established by the 
Newtonian world--which generally limit (reduce) themselves 
to either material or efficient causes (Rychlak, 1988, 
1985)--i.e., the external or internal forces mentioned 
above. 
Logical Learning Theory offers a distinctive set of 
12 
concepts that challenge traditional notions about the 
process of cognition and meaningful human activity. While 
these concepts, in themselves, are not unique, when taken 
together they provide a unique and provocative agentive 
theory of human activity. For purposes of this thesis some 
key concepts need to be defined: The mediational process 
explanation, the predicational process explanation, 
dialectical meaning, oppositionality and telosponse. 
When addressing the issue of learning processes, 
Rychlak (1988b) makes a distinction between two kinds of 
theoretical explanation: mediational theorizing and 
predicational theorizing. The mediational theoretical model 
always assumes that "something formed outside [the learning] 
process is taken in and comes to play a role in that process 
that is not intrinsic to it" (p.118). That is, the process 
mediates for the stimulus, or "input", which is extrinsic to 
the process and is the prompting signal for getting the 
process "up and running." The mediational process conveys 
rather than creates meaning. The meaning derived from the 
process is contingent and necessary; the process itself 
never articulates or forms the meaning, it only plays an 
instrumental role in making the proper connection for the 
meaning to occur. This is essentially a description of the 
behavioristic stimulus-response model which sees frequency 
and contiguity as the sole force (efficient cause) behind 
learning. Many cognitive theories base their explanation of 
human learning on the same mediational process, only they 
are interested in describing the mechanisms that occur 
between stimulus and response, but they are necessary 
mechanisms nonetheless. 
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In contrast, the predicational process explanation, 
upon which LLT is based, describes a process of learning and 
meaning that involves "the act of affirming, denying, or 
qualifying broader patterns of meaning in relation to 
narrower or targeted patterns of meaning" (ibid., 1988a, 
p.119). It is a top-down process. For example, when we say 
"all men are mortal," mortality is the larger meaning and 
man is the narrower or "target" meaning. The act of 
predicating also establishes a context, as in the major 
premise of a syllogism, which extends meaning to the minor 
premises and conclusion. 
This is not to say that predication is tied exclusively 
to syntax and grammar; predication is essentially a semantic 
process, with meaning being fundamental. Meaning is 
patterned organization, symbolizing intention. The 
predicational process places the predicator at center stage, 
allowing for the meaning to be created by the process not 
something extrinsic to it. Since in a mediational process 
the process itself never articulates or forms meaning, 
something like predication could only be secondary and 
essentially mechanistic, as in some cognitive theories. 
Thus, after taking in "men" and "mortality" and a few other 
14 
connecting words like "all" and "are," the mediational 
process can combine--through frequency and contiguity--word 
units into the sentence "all men are mortal." The main 
point is that the predication process sees the agent as the 
creator of meaning and the mediational process sees stimuli 
or inputs as the source for the illusion of meaning. The 
person is active in the predicational process and passive in 
the mediational. 
It is here that our above discussion of theory and 
assumptions is pertinent. Since scientific knowledge grows 
only as fast as theories are able to generate and nurture 
that knowledge, whether the fruits of such knowledge are 
bitter or sweet depend, ultimately, on the bitter or sweet 
potential of its theoretical-assumptive roots. For the 
mediational theorist, the person is a conveyer rather a 
creator of meaning. Conversely, the predicational theorist 
takes the person to be the active contributor of meaning. 
These two mutually exclusive assumptions about human beings 
form the roots of two very different trees of scientific 
knowledge. Logical learning theory maintains that the 
predicational model of human learning is worth nurturing 
through empirical cultivation because it can potentially 
yield a rich body of knowledge that affirms human agency. 
In the remainder of this chapter and the following chapter, 
we will attempt to further elucidate those aspects of the 
predicational process of learning that are of particular 
15 
relevance to research conducted for this thesis. 
Dialectical Oppositionality 
The seminal idea of predication came from Aristotle's 
work, employing his notion of formal and final causation. 
Logical Learning Theory employs dialectical reasoning to 
account for both the formal and final cause contribution of 
the person to his or her behavior. For human action to be 
meaningful in any real sense the action must be ''that, as 
opposed to this, for the sake of which"; human activity must 
have purpose rather than merely being a "response" to 
stimuli. Since dialectics has a long philosophical history, 
as well as a long list of different meanings (see Georgoudi, 
1983; Reese, 1982; Rychlak, 1976), it is important to 
clarify what aspects of the dialectical tradition LLT 
employs. 
Originally dialectics, derived from the Greek adjective 
dialektikos, meant conversation or discussion (see the 
Oxford English Dictionary) . This particular meaning is 
still retained in at least one contemporary sense which 
refers to idea of debate or argumentation. Throughout the 
history of Western philosophy, dialectics has taken on many 
forms. For some preSocrates (e.g., Anaximander, Parmenides, 
Zeno and Heraclitus), Plato's Socrates, dialectics meant a 
method for ascertaining truth through the analysis or 
reconciliation of apparent oppositions or contradictions of 
16 
reality (Reese, 1982, p. 424) . Later, Aristotle 
distinguished between demonstrative and dialectical inquiry 
or reasoning; the former referring to the kind of 
syllogistic reasoning that begins with "primitive" or 
primary and true premises and the latter referring to 
syllogistic reasoning that uses as its starting point 
generally accepted opinions. Aristotle held that 
dialectical inquiry or reasoning is "a process of criticism 
wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries" 
(Runes, 1983, pp. 94-95). 
Both Medieval (e.g., Augustine and Aquinas) and Modern 
philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx all include, to 
varying degrees, the idea of dialectics, though each 
philosopher tends to use the term in very different ways. 
Kant uses the term to describe that part of his philosophy 
which critically analyzes the difficult attempt to apply the 
categories of understanding beyond the objectified realm of 
time and space to transcendental realm of antinomies, 
paralogisms and ideas. For Hegel, of course, dialectical 
idealism refers to ongoing thesis-antithesis-synthesis 
transformations which are teleological in nature. Marx's 
dialectical materialism, while still interested in 
opposition or negation (thesis-antithesis), locates this 
process in materialism or historical materialism eschewing 
Hegel's ontological idealism and, in most senses, his 
teleology. 
17 
While we have only touched briefly on the variety of 
meanings associated with dialectics in Western thought [the 
dialectic is ever present in most Eastern philosophies as 
well; see Nakamura (1964) and Kuo (1976)], there are some 
common themes, as well as some elaborations, that run 
through the history of dialectical meaning. Georgoudi 
(1983), in his review of dialectics, suggests following 
commonalities and elaborations: dialectic orientation is 
opposed to all metaphysical conceptions that claim 
psychological processes, social structures or material 
conditions as the primary cause of human activity; it is 
usually viewed as a process of relating between elements as 
subject and object or consciousness and being; dialectical 
relations are founded on negation or contradiction; negation 
is dynamic, always in play; it is concerned not with states 
of being but the process of becoming; dialectics is 
teleological; and finally, dialectical relationships are 
grounded on concrete lived experiences and not on reified 
abstractions. 
Dialectical meaning is the sine qua non of LLT, which 
embraces some but not all of the preceding descriptions. 
Its interests lie in the human capacity to think and reason 
in terms of opposition. Rychlak (1988a, p.511) describes 
dialectical meaning as "meaning in which relations are said 
to bear the characteristics of oppositionality, duality, 
relationality, contradiction, and arbitrariness." Logical 
18 
learning theory maintains that many--perhaps all--meanings 
are bipolar, and they can be apprehended only in terms of 
their opposites. Note, however, that LLT employs 
dialectical meaning to describe the relationship of meanings 
within the predication process and is thus part and parcel 
of the process (contra other dialectical explanations). 
Furthermore, human beings are by nature capable of dealing 
with this oppositionality by creating dialectical 
alternatives. Because of this there is never only a single 
cognitive or behavioral alternative available to a person at 
any one time. Agency--or affirming one line of reasoning or 
behavioral activity over another--is required within this 
theoretical perspective. 
The oppositional nature of the dialectic implies that 
meaning is, at the very least, bipolar. For example, if one 
is confronted with a list of twenty traffic rules, 
immediately one has at the very least forty alternatives, 
not to mention a myriad of other alternatives, combinations 
and degrees. Inherent in any meaning is its opposite. In 
fact, meaning is delimited by it opposite. And thus LLT 
uses the term "oppositionality" 6 which encompasses 
contrariety (all is X, none is X), contradiction. (all is X, 
at least one is not X), negation (All is X, That is an 
6-Since there are a large variety of meanings associated 
with the idea of dialectics, in recent years Rychlak has 
essentially replaced the term "dialectical meaning" with 
"oppositionality" to avoid misunderstanding and confusion 
about what he means by dialectics. 
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untrue premise) and contrast ("this" versus "that"). 
contrariety is the most basic concept here, from which the 
other three spring. Oppositionality refers specifically to 
the bipolar, or dichotomous, aspects of a continuum of 
alternatives in any given situation or context. It is in 
oppositionality that any other alternative is possible. 
To better understand how meaning is defined and 
delimited by its opposite and how this relates to the 
predicational process, it is sometimes helpful to think of 
meaning in terms of Euler circles (see Fig. 1). For 
example, if we say that "all men are mortal," we could 
represent "mortality" as the larger circle (or broader 
pattern of meaning) and "all men'' (the targeted or narrower 
meaning) as the smaller circle inside the larger circle. 
What is often forgotten is that there in meaning outside the 
larger circle ("not morality" or "immortality") that 
delimits and thus adds to the meaning of mortality. We 
don't often think of meaning this way because the opposite 
or the negation of a particular meaning is usually not 
articulated or explicitly understood. Nevertheless, in any 
act of predication the opposite of any meaning is 
necessarily implied. This places oppositionality at center 
stage in the predicational process. 
Meaning 
Oppositional Meaning 
(not mortality) 
Broader Meaning 
(mortality) 
Target Meaning 
(men) 
Fig. 1 
It is tempting as psychologists, inclined to look for 
universal categories and their operationalizations, to see 
oppositionality as merely content categories of opposing 
meanings. This is essentially how mediational theorist 
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would view opposites. A mediational model of learning would 
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not include oppositional meanings at the simple, initial 
level of stimulus inputs. As explained earlier, in a 
mediational model oppositional meaning could only be present 
in learning later when higher order meaning can be formed--
that is, after a series of oppositional stimuli can be 
paired or encoded or attached together through frequency and 
contiguity. This learning would require, then, that there 
be static, universal opposites that form strong associations 
through frequency and contiguity. The key to understanding 
oppositionality under this model would essentially involve 
constructing a taxonomy of specific meanings and their 
opposites. This, in turn, would require one to ask odd 
questions such as, for example, "what thing is the opposite 
of red?" This would be an important question since the 
mediational model sees external contents as producing 
opposite meanings in a bottom-up fashion. 
Conversely, a predicational process of learning put 
forth by LLT does not see the accumulation of oppositional 
content categories as forming oppositional meaning. In a 
top-down fashion, as stated earlier, the process of framing 
or predicating meaning includes oppositional meaning at the 
outset. Oppositionality is immediate, not sequential. When 
a particular meaning is grasped, so is its opposite. 
Oppositionality is inherent to the process of creating 
meaning and not the contents, which are the products of such 
a process. Opposites are not static because the pro,cess 
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creates opposites given particular contexts with particular 
contents. 
To further illustrate this point, we could say the 
opposite of "red" is "not red," or, by contrast, is "green." 
If one is watching a basketball game between a team dressed 
in red and a team dressed in green, it is easy to see how 
one might understand green to be the opposite of red. 
Moreover, green might be considered the opposite or red if 
one is sitting at a stop light. Again, however, we might be 
tempted to see a particular content within a context as 
determining the oppositional meaning. But this would be 
misleading because for any given content within a context 
there is, in principle, an infinite number of opposites. 
The opposite of a particular content within a context is 
produced by the process and not that particular content. 
Therefore, LLT would explain green as the opposite of red 
within the context of watching a basketball game only 
because oppositionality, as part of the predicational 
process, always suggests "this" as opposed to "that," and 
not because we have somehow associated red with green enough 
times within this context to see them as opposites. This 
distinction between process and content is essential to 
understanding how the predicational process of learning 
differs from the mediational process. 
In order to explain the process of how an individual 
may affirm or embrace one or the other ends of bipolar 
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meanings, LLT uses a technical term called the ''telosponse." 
Telosponse--as opposed to "response"--refers to "taking on a 
meaningful item (e.g., image, word judgmental comparison) 
relating to a referent acting as a purpose for the sake of 
which behavior is then intended" (Rychlak, 1988b, p.283). 
This is to say that humans have an innate mental ability to 
choose among alternatives (at the very least oppositions) in 
a meaningful way that makes their choosing uniquely theirs 
and not merely a product of incoming stimuli. In everyday 
language we would probably ref er to this process as acting 
intentionally; and intentional acts, according to LLT, is 
what make human agency possible. For purposes of the 
empirical research included in this thesis, however, we have 
concerned ourselves strictly with the concept of 
oppositionality and not with telosponse per se. 
The foregoing is necessarily an abbreviated discussion 
of Logical Learning Theory. For a complete explication the 
reader is referred to Rychlak's (1988a) treatment of the 
topic. The purpose of this thesis is to empirically 
investigate practical applications of LLT dealing with the 
central construct of oppositionality. Chapter III will 
review pervious research that has looked at oppositionality 
in learning. Further definitions, explanations, 
distinctions and operationalizations will be made in that 
chapter and in other chapters of the thesis. 
In summary, LLT involves a predicational process in 
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which a wider framework of meaning is used to endow a 
targeted item (or narrower meaning) with additional meaning, 
thus establishing a context within which targeted items are 
made more meaningful. Since oppositionality is an inherent 
part of that process and provides a bipolar framework within 
which meaning is apprehended, it stands to reason that if an 
oppositional context is used in learning and memory tasks, 
it will have a greater facilitatory effect on learning than 
a non-oppositional context. The experiments described in 
chapters IV, V, VI are designed to test the validity of this 
assertion. 
CHAPTER III 
Literature Review 
Because what's present doesn't last, 
The opposite of it is past. 
Or if you look ahead, 
Future's the opposite instead. 
Or look around to see what's here, 
and absent things will not appear. 
There's one more opposite of present 
That's really almost too unpleasant: 
It is when someone takes away 
Something with which you like to play. 
--Richard Wilbur 
"The concept of opposition," writes Rodney Needham 
(1987, p.xi-xii), 
is one of the most antique in the history of 
disciplined thought, and it is to be discerned in the 
most disparate and far-separated forms of civilization. 
. . . Opposition would thus seem to be a fundamental 
notion and thereby qualified to serve as a basic 
predicate in the interpretation of human experience and 
its most general modes of representation. 
And, indeed, it does appear that almost from the beginning 
of our Western philosophical tradition, philosophers have 
concerned themselves with opposition in terms of 
metaphysics, epistemology and ontology. As Ogden (1967, p. 
21-33) points out, "Heraclitus had described his flux and 
Becoming as a union of the opposites, Being and Notbeing; 
Xenophanes had represented the amalgamation of one and All 
in God as immanent unity of opposites; Parmenides had found 
in the reciprocal relation of a series of pairs of opposites 
the constitution of the world of Appearance, and Plato made 
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the contradiction between this world and that of the 
Eternal, the Unchangeable and the Perfect a basis for his 
entire Theory of Ideas." Of course this early Greek concern 
with opposites culminated with Aristotle in what Ogden 
(ibid.) calls "Aristotle's obsession with the problem 
opposition" or what is generally identified as Aristotle's 
theory of contrariety (See Anton, 1957; Babin 1940; Ogden, 
1967), which was briefly outlined in chapter II. 
In chapter II we also mentioned in our discussion of 
dialectics later philosophical approaches that embody an 
oppositional nature at the most fundamental level. To be 
sure, the great dualisms generated by Western thought, e.g., 
subject/object, absolute/relative, spiritual/physical, 
one/many, reason/faith, mind/body, individual/community, 
free will/determinism, nature/nurture, are all oppositional 
in nature. Logical Learning Theory would predict such 
fundamental dualism or oppositions in our philosophical 
tradition because it claims that thought, mentation or 
cognition itself is based on oppositionality from the 
outset--the "inside" versus "outside" of categorical 
reasoning (see Chapter II, Figure 1). The purpose of this 
literature review, however, is not to catalogue the examples 
and instances of oppositional thinking from our Western 
tradition. In this chapter, we are interested in reviewing 
empirical research that has specifically advanced our 
understanding 0£ how oppositionality plays a role in the 
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cognitive process itself. While this genre of research is 
relatively new, the reader may find that there is now enough 
empirical research dealing with oppositionality to warrant 
further empirical verification and exploration in this area. 
Linguists have long recognized the importance that 
opposition plays in language. I. A. Richards, for example, 
in his introduction to Ogden's (1967) treatise (referred to 
above) tells us that the chief principle by which language 
works is opposition. Lyons (1977) explains that "opposition 
is one of the most important principles governing the 
structure of language" (p. 271). And Atkinson, Kilby and 
Roca (1982) have pointed out that "Pairs of words which are 
opposite in meaning are a pervasive feature of the semantic 
structure of any language" (p. 181). 
Empirical evidence supporting the claim that opposition 
plays a fundamental and "pervasive" role in "any" language 
has only in recent years found its way into the social 
science literature. For example, Raybeck and Herrmann 
(1990), in an ambitious study that looked at eight different 
cultures found that when comparing contradictory/ 
directional, contradictory/ reverse and reverse/directional 
semantic relationships (all of which fall under our 
definition of opposition) with other forms of synonymic or 
associative relationships, the "opposites are the semantic 
relations upon which the members of different cultures most 
strongly agree" (p.470). This kind of study substantiates 
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Osgood's (1952) procedure of using bipolar or oppositional 
meanings to study how widely different cultures make 
connotative judgments (see Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). 
oppositionality and Cognitive Development 
Not only is there evidence that oppositionality is 
culturally universal, there is now concrete evidence 
suggesting that the capacity for creating oppositional 
meanings or categories begins at a very early age. Kagan 
(1984) informs us that "As the child creates categories, she 
is disposed to invent their complement. Soon after learning 
the meaning of up, the child learns the meaning of down; 
after learning the meaning of high, she learns the meaning 
of low; after good, she develops the meaning of bad. The 
appreciation of opposites is comprehended too early and too 
easily to be the product of painstaking instruction" (p. 
189) . 
An example of this kind oppositional comprehension is 
Carey's (1978) research from which she has shown that 
children, as young as two years old, have the ability to 
contrast the meanings of "big" and "little," meanings that 
"seem to be acquired at the same time and are mapped onto 
the core comparative structure (including polarity) 
immediately" (p. 279). Carey's research clarifies Kagan's 
observations by suggesting that children learn the meaning 
of "big" and "little" simultaneously and not just "soon 
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after'' as Kagan suggests. Her research also echos earlier 
research conducted by Brewer and Stone (1975) who argued 
that at least for spatial meanings, children learn "the 
polarity of a dimension before they learn the dimension 
itself" (p.306). This clarification is consistent with LLT's 
predicational process which suggests that meaning itself is 
constructed oppositionally. 
In another study involving semantic relationships, 
Kreutzer, Leonard & Flavell (1975) interviewed elementary 
school children (K, 1, 3, 5) to see how much the children 
themselves knew about various memory-related phenomena. 
When they were asked about the kinds of semantic 
relationships they thought would be easiest to learn, their 
responses revealed that with an increase in age came the 
tendency to assert that the oppositional meanings are easier 
to learn. Later research conducted by Landis, Herrmann, and 
Chaffin (1987) confirmed those assertions when they found 
that when comparing the performances of second and eight 
grade students who were asked to make judgments about 
semantic relations, both the second and eight grader's 
judgments about opposites were much more accurate than their 
judgments about other semantic relationships. That 
oppositionality or what is sometimes called antonymic 
structure is fundamental to the learning process is 
underscored by the fact that educators are now advocating 
"teaching vocabulary through opposition'' (Powell, 1986). 
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The child's natural ability to frame and understand 
oppositional meaning is perhaps best illustrated by the 
poems found in Richard Wilbur's book entitled Opposites 
(1973), one of which introduced this chapter. Wilbur 
explains that the material for the dialectical poems 
contained in this book came from a game he and his children 
would play in which one member of the family would suggest a 
word, and then everyone would join in a lively quarrel about 
its proper opposite. 
The ability to utilize oppositional meaning has been 
found to be associated with creativity, mental health and 
maturity. Rothenberg (1973) conducted an experiment which 
demonstrated that subjects who score high on creativity 
scales have a stronger tendency to engage in "Janusian 
thinking,'' a "capacity to conceive and utilize two or more 
opposite or contradictory concepts, images or ideas 
simultaneously." Hogben and Jacobs (1972) found that 
schizophrenic subjects tend to "appraise words with similar 
sound but dissimilar meaning and words of antithetical 
meaning as similar in meaning more frequently than normal 
subjects" (p. 296). And Basseches (1980) reported that a 
content analysis of interviews about the nature of education 
conducted with freshman, seniors and faculty members of a 
university revealed the faculty members had a significantly 
broader range of dialectical schemata than seniors or 
freshman, and seniors had a significantly broader 
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dialectical schemata than freshman. 
oppositionality and Word Association Tasks 
As early as 1948, Karwoski and Schachter, through a 
series of free association experiments, found that 
contrasting words (or words opposite in meaning) were 
readily produced, usually faster and more frequently than 
words similar in meaning to the stimulus words. Similar 
results were found by Siipola, Walker, and Kolb (1955) when 
subjects were asked to produce words in either high pressure 
or relaxed conditions. Kjeldergaard (1962) found, in 
another word association task, that subjects', when asked to 
do so, could produce equal if not greater numbers of 
oppositional words than when asked to give the first 
response that came to them. Carol, Kjeldergaard, and Carton 
(1962) also found that oppositional responses are 
consistent, independent tendencies in word association 
tasks. This is an important finding since many opposite 
responses on standard word-association norms are also 
primary responses. 
It stands to reason that if oppositionality plays a 
prominent role in free association tasks, it is likely that 
oppositionality will also play a role in transfer effects or 
generalization in learning. This is indeed the case. As 
early as 1960, Ryan found that when subjects were given 
different types of transfer lists--associated 
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(oppositional), similar and control--the associated list 
produced significantly greater transfer effects than either 
similar or control lists, suggesting that oppositional 
meaning is fundamental to semantic organizational patterns. 
This finding has been repeatedly confirmed by later 
research, utilizing a variety of transfer tasks (Bastian, 
1961; Mink, 1963; Weiss-shedd, 1973; Wickens & Chermak, 
1967). 
A considerable amount of research dealing with the 
associative structure of common english adjectives in 
particular also points to the prominent role that antonymic 
meaning or oppositionality plays in semantic cognitive 
patterns. Reese (1964, 1965) was one of the first to look 
at the associative strength and structure of adjectives. 
When using a stimulus list that included nearly all common 
adjectives in the English language, Reese (1964) found that 
"a very considerable portion of the associative meaning of 
common English adjectives can be directly described by the 
contrast of a polar-opposite scheme" (p.349). Contemporary 
research in semantic memory has also noted the prominent 
role bipolar or "marked" antonymic adjectives play in the 
organization of meaning (Zagrodzki, 1986; Gross, Fischer, & 
Miller, 1989). After reviewing the relevant literature and 
conducting their own experiments that look at the 
organization of adjectival meaning, Gross, Fischer, and 
Miller (1989) conclude that "predicative adjectives are 
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organized in semantic memory in clusters of synonymous (or 
nearly synonymous) terms, and that pairs of clusters are 
held together conceptually by bipolar attributes whose 
opposite ends are labeled by direct antonyms that provide 
foci for the clusters" (p. 96). Moreover, Brewer and 
Lichtenstein (1974) have conducted research that calls into 
question findings which contend that "unmarked" antonymic 
features do not function in the same way that marked 
antonymic features do in semantic organizations (see also 
Grossmann and Eagle, 1970), suggesting that oppositionality 
is truly a semantic rather than simply a syntactic or 
lexical feature. The oppositional nature of adjectival 
meaning is of particular interest to us since the 
experiments for this thesis require the use of adjectives. 
By now it should be obvious that oppositional meaning 
is important to the learning and memory process. It should 
be noted, however, that underlying assumptions about how 
oppositional or antonymic meaning comes to play an important 
role in cognition is fundamentally different for LLT than 
for most language and learning theories. Furthermore, the 
theoretical explanation for the findings for many of the 
preceding studies does not include oppositionality, nor does 
it include the nomenclature we have used to describe LLT and 
oppositionality in particular. For example, Deese (1965) 
prefers to treat oppositional findings as manifestations of 
similarity or contiguity. As outlined in chapter II most 
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learning theories embrace a mediational model of learning in 
which incoming stimuli form the building blocks of semantic 
organization or structure in a bottom-up fashion through 
frequency and contiguity. In other words, the contents 
(stimuli) determine the semantic relationships established 
in learning and memory. Conversely, a Logical Learning 
Theorist would want to argue that the predicational process 
forms (requires) oppositional meaning and not the contents 
of the process. Consequently, the theoretical 
interpretation and language attached to much of the 
preceding evidence for oppositionality would be 
fundamentally and substantially different for one 
subscribing to the tenets of LLT. We would argue that the 
pervasive evidence for oppositionality is due not solely to 
incoming stimuli, but more fundamentally to the predication 
process, a process requiring that meaning be framed 
oppositionally. 
It appears that there is some research which suggests 
that the processing of semantic relationships into 
oppositional dimensions enhances and perhaps forms the 
meaning of any specific semantic relationship. We have 
already called attention to Brewer and Stone's (1975) 
finding that little children use the polarity of a dimension 
before they learned the particular labels of a dimension. 
The work of linguists such Chaffin and Herrmann (1985, 1981) 
has shown that in a variety of verbal tasks the semantic 
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relationship between words is more crucial to processing 
semantic information than the meaning of individual words 
themselves (see also Chaffin, Russo, and Hermann, 1981; 
Herrmann, Chaffin, Conti, Peters, & Robbins, 1979; Herrmann, 
Chaffin, Daniel, & Wool, 1986). That is to say, the 
relationship between antonymic pairs appears to be more 
salient than the meaning of the words that form the 
antonymic pair. This is consistent with logical learning 
theory's claim that the predicational process is fundamental 
to learning specific meanings. 
The Utilization of Oppositionality 
Several studies have been published in recent years 
that directly employ and test the theoretical constructs of 
LLT. A bulk of the research has investigated the 
oppositional nature of affective assessment, a special case 
of oppositionality. It is beyond the scope of this 
literature review to describe the findings of this 
burgeoning area of research. For a review of this line of 
investigation, the reader is referred to Rychlak's (1988a, 
Chapter 9) analysis of this important research. The 
remainder of this chapter will describe in some detail three 
recent research projects that have tested directly the 
utilization of oppositionality in learning tasks without the 
added variable of affective assessment. 
Hyde and Jenkins (1969) investigated the effects of 
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intentional and two types incidental learning tasks on the 
recall of highly associated words. The intentional task 
group was presented with a list of words and asked to 
remember them for future recall; a semantic task group was 
asked to rate the same list of words as to their 
pleasantness or unpleasantness (incidental learning); and a 
non-semantic task group was asked to look at each word in 
the same list for a particular letter (incidental learning). 
Those who learned the list either intentionally or 
semantically performed equally well in both recalling and 
organizing of the stimulus list, and superior to the non-
semantic task group. Even though Hyde and Jenkins used both 
synonym and antonym pairs in this study they did not test 
the possibility of effects due to oppositionality. 
This is precisely what Williams and Lilly {1985) set 
out to do in their investigation of incidental learning. 
They conducted two experiments, one of which is of interest 
to us. The relevant experiment was designed to test whether 
subjects could recall more antonym pairs than non-antonym 
pairs in an intentional and three incidental learning tasks. 
After generating a list of 24 words, half of which were 
antonym pairs and the other half non-antonym pairs, they 
gave the same list to four groups. Similar to Hyde and 
Jenkins, the intentional learning group was instructed to 
learn the list for future recall. Another group of subjects 
was instructed to decide whether they liked or disliked each 
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word in the list (semantic task). A third group was asked 
to decide whether they thought each word was abstract or 
concrete (semantic task). And a fourth group was instructed 
to estimate the number of letters in each word (nonsemantic 
task). Williams and Lilly predicted that subjects would 
recall more antonym pairs than non-antonym pairs across 
groups. And in fact, among other results, they did find 
that oppositional pairs were recalled significantly better 
than nonoppositional pairs for all groups. 
In another study Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj (1986) 
tested the facilitory effect of oppositionality in learning 
male and female names framed from oppositional or 
nonoppositional descriptor pairs. The four oppositional and 
nonoppositional pairs were: quiet-outspoken (oppositional), 
cautious-bold (oppositional), outspoken-bold 
(nonoppositional), and cautious-quiet (nonoppositional). 
Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj predicted that subjects would 
more readily learn the male and female names that were 
framed from an oppositional context than those that were 
framed from a nonoppositional context. As predicted, the 
statistical analysis yielded a main effect for 
oppositionality, demonstrating that the oppositional 
condition facilitated learning better than nonoppositional 
condition. 
Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj (ibid.) designed a second 
experiment that removed word meaning from consideration by 
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using consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) trigrams. They 
essentially turned a paired-associates format into a 
triassociation format. For this experiment two groups of 
subjects (one high school students, the other college 
freshmen) were asked to learn a series of trigrams by means 
of different types predication relationships. To 
illustrate, some subjects were asked to learn four types of 
predications for the trigram HIB: HIB is always VIC 
(identity), HIB is never QIN (negation), Hib is sometimes 
YAT (qualification), and HIB is the opposite of JOQ 
(opposition) . This study is a significant test of 
predicational process since the trigrams had no inherent 
semantic of syntactic relationship among themselves. 
Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj predicted that an oppositional 
predication will facilitate learning eve trigrams equally as 
well as an identity predication and that opposition will be 
superior to negation or qualification predications. As 
expected, they found that oppositional predications did as 
well or better than identity, negation or qualification 
predications, suggesting that oppositionality is in play 
even when the word meanings are absent. 
Finally, Rychlak, Barnard, Williams and Wollman (1989) 
have conducted a series of experiments designed to 
demonstrate that subjects can recognize oppositional 
patterns in word meanings and sentences, that they can come 
to problem solutions by reasoning oppositionally, that 
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through practice they can transform sentence meanings 
oppositionally, and that they can process oppositional 
meanings rapidly and accurately when distinguishing between 
opposition and nonoppositional meaning. 
In the first experiment, subjects were given 3X5 cards 
which had written on them eight words such as: tally, 
reject, order, endorse, state approve, help, decline. Of 
the eight words in this example, two (endorse and approve) 
are opposites of "reject" and one (decline) is a synonym. 
Subjects played a "two-touch" game with the experimenter 
which allowed subject to identify either antonyms and 
control words or synonyms and control words. Subjects were 
placed in either an antonym vs. control or a synonym vs. 
control condition. Rychlak et al. found that subjects were 
just as sensitive to the antonymic patterns as they were to 
the synonymic patterns. 
In experiment two, the experimenters devised a clever 
scenario in which subjects, in order prevent a catastrophe, 
had to choose between several different patterns marked by 
A's and B's (e.g., AABBAAB), some of which were 
oppositional, others reflected a recency or primacy pattern 
in relation to the original pattern, and still others had no 
recognizable pattern as a control. It was found that 
subjects recognized and utilized the oppositional patterns 
as readily as the recency/primacy patterns when compared to 
the control patterns. 
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In a third experiment, Rychlak et al. wanted see if 
oppositionality would occur in recognizing meaningful 
statements and actually increase in facility as a result of 
practice. Subjects were asked to memorize 24 brief 
statements (e.g., "the elephant climbed the ladder") and 
were assigned to three different conditions that reflected 
different ways in which to understand the original 
statements. The three conditions were as follows: 
identical ("the elephant climbed the ladder"), paraphrase 
("the elephant went up"), and opposite ("the elephant went 
down"). The statistical analysis revealed the identical 
condition was to easy, but in both the paraphrase and 
opposite conditions subjects improved their cognition 
steadily with every trial, thus supporting the hypothesis 
the oppositional meaning can be recognized in otherwise 
meaningful statements and can improve with practice to 
facilitate learning. 
In the fourth and final study, Rychlak et al. compared 
the accuracy and speed with which subjects could recognize 
oppositional or nonoppositional meaning in a meaningful 
statement. To do this, they modified the procedures of the 
third experiment by giving subjects a prime sentence (e.g., 
"The ant crushed the rock") followed by either simple or 
complex paraphrase statements ("the ant was strong," "the 
ant was not weak"), or by simple or complex opposite 
statements ("the ant did not crush the rock,"the and was 
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weak"). The findings for this experiment revealed that 
subjects could, in fact, recognize and respond to 
oppositional meanings with accuracy and speed that equalled 
or exceeded their recognition of and response to the 
paraphrase statements. 
In the foregoing, we have tried to build an empirical 
case for the presence of oppositionality, as defined by LLT, 
in learning tasks. There is ample evidence to suggest that 
oppositionality figures prominently in cognitive processes. 
In this last section of the chapter, we described a small 
number experiments that have begun to look directly at how 
oppositional meaning might not only be present in learning 
but how it might actually facilitate learning. The 
experiments conducted for this thesis were designed to test 
and extend in application the facilitory effects of 
oppositional meaning to learning tasks that have not yet 
been investigated. Specifically, we wanted to see if 
subjects could more readily learn such things as personality 
styles and difficult words if given a oppositional 
predicational context. 
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT I 
In order to test our predictions concerning the 
relationship between learning and oppositionality we 
designed three studies. All three are variations on the 
same theme. Two of the studies were designed to ascertain 
whether subjects could more readily recall personality 
descriptors given a semantically oppositional rather than 
nonoppositional context. The third study was designed to 
ascertain whether subjects could more readily recall the 
definitions of difficult words when those definitions are 
learned using an oppositional context verses a 
nonoppositional context. This chapter will describe and 
report the results of the first of the two studies involving 
personality descriptors. 
METHOD 
Hypothesis: 
Subjects who are asked to learn adjectives describing 
the personality styles of faces will require fewer trials to 
learn these adjectives when they are presented in an 
oppositonal rather than a nonoppositional context. 
Rationale: According to LLT, learning involves 
predication, in which a wider framework of meaning is 
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extended to a targeted item, or narrower meaning (see 
chapter II). Predications always establish a context within 
which other items are situated. The clearer this context is 
and the richer it is with meaning, the more readily learning 
will take place. Oppositionality--encompassing contrariety, 
contradiction, negation and contrast--provides a wide-
ranging and rich (with meaning) context within which an item 
can be situated and hence learned. Thus, if a subject is 
required to associate a face with two personality 
descriptors such as "dominant or submissive," he or she will 
have a wide-range predication, a broadly framed yet 
intrinsically related and meaningful context within which to 
situate the face. The figure depicting Euler circles on p. 
20 in Chapter II illustrates this intrinsic relationship. 
The direct oppositional relationship of "dominant or 
submissive" lends a clearly comparable meaning context to 
the targeted face. Consequently, it should be easier to 
recall a particular meaning that is an extension of an 
oppositional predication. 
In contrast, when a subject has to associate a face 
with "dominant or impulsive," the meaning of "impulsive" in 
relation to "dominant" lacks a clear relational meaning 
context in which to target the face, because the 
relationship of "dominant" to "impulsive" adds relative 
confusion to the context. "Dominant" does not delimit 
"impulsive" and vice versa. Consequently, recognizing a 
meaning that is an extension of a nonoppositional context 
should prove to be more difficult. 
subjects: 
Subjects were male and female college students who 
participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement for their introductory psychology class 
at Loyola University of Chicago. A total of forty (N=40) 
undergraduate students (18 males, 22 females) participated 
in this experiment. 
Procedure 
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Before beginning the experiment, subjects were given a 
statement of informed consent to be read and signed (see 
appendix A). This statement emphasized that their 
participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw from 
the experiment at any time without incurring a penalty, and 
that their performance would be kept confidential. Subjects 
were then given specific instructions on how the learning 
experiment would proceed. They were encouraged to ask 
questions about the procedure. Subjects were tested 
individually in the same or similar room with comparable 
conditions to help avoid random irrelevances in the setting. 
To test our hypothesis we arranged for a single subject 
to be shown, using a carousel projector, a series of eight 
pictures of individual faces flashed on a screen. Following 
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each face, a pair of adjectives that could describe the this 
person was shown on the screen (e.g., dominant- submissive 
or dominant-impulsive) . There were four oppositional and 
four nonoppositional adjective pairs in each list of eight 
faces. Following each pair of either oppositional or 
nonoppositional adjectives, the "correct" adjective would 
appear (e.g., either submissive or impulsive). Each picture 
was followed by a pair of personality descriptors and then 
by a single "correct" descriptor. Each slide (face, 
descriptor pair or single "correct" descriptor) appeared in 
five-second intervals. 
Each subject was told that ''In this study we are trying 
to find out how easy it is to learn a person's personality 
style or reputation." The subjects were asked to remember 
the ''correct" personality style for the appropriate face. 
All subjects were given a practice trial, using three faces 
and descriptors not included in the experiment proper, to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure. After the 
practice trial, and after subjects had viewed each face and 
its accompanying descriptors to be used in the experiment 
once (one trial), the subjects were instructed to call out, 
from the second trial and thereafter, the "correct" 
descriptor before the pair of oppositional or 
nonoppositional descriptors appeared on the screen. 
Correctly calling out the proper descriptor constituted a 
"hit''; and an incorrect response or no response at all 
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constituted a ''miss." Subjects were informed of their hits 
and misses, and each hit and miss was simultaneously 
recorded on a trial grid sheet for each of the eight faces 
across trials. Subjects completed the experiment by 
correctly calling out all eight descriptors for each face 
twice in a row in two consecutive trials. If a subject 
accurately anticipated the ''correct" descriptor for all the 
pictures in a particular trial but then missed correctly 
anticipating at least one descriptor in the following trial, 
the subject would then have to correctly anticipate the 
descriptors for every picture in the next two trials in 
order for the experiment to stop. 
After subjects had completed the experiment, they 
were given a written debriefing (see appendix B) concerning 
the purpose of the experiment. When the subjects had 
finished reading the debriefing, the experimenter took time 
to explain any unanswered questions. The experimenter then 
signed the subjects' verification form and they were 
dismissed. Ten subjects were used to pretest experimental 
material and procedures. 
Materials 
The pictures used for this experiment were taken from a 
1960s Purdue University yearbook. All eight slides 
consisted of black and white photographs of Caucasian males. 
To avoid position effects (e.g., primacy/recency), the faces 
and their accompanying descriptors were arranged in three 
different random orders across trials. The three orders 
were repeatedly rotated until the subjects completed the 
experiment. 
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The sixteen descriptors used in this experiment (see 
appendix C) were selected from Anderson's (1968) 
"likableness ratings of 555 personality words" norms. 
Anderson's norms allowed us to control for positive and 
negative affective association and the level of ambiguity in 
meaning. The selection process involved choosing equal 
numbers of liked and disliked words that had a minimum of 
ambiguity. Eight of the descriptors chosen were among the 
top 102 most liked words. None of these eight words had a 
score less than 4.66 on a scale that ranged from 0-6, a 
score of 6 being "the most favorable or desirable." The 
other eight descriptors (opposite in meaning to the first 
eight) were chosen from among the bottom 121 most disliked 
words. None of these eight words had a likableness rating 
higher than 1.53 on a scale that ranged from 0-6, a score of 
o being "the least favorable or desirable." There were 
equal numbers (four each) of liked and disliked words 
selected for the "correct" descriptors that followed each 
pair of semantically oppositional or nonoppositional 
descriptors. For example, a subject would see a face, then 
two adjectives such as "polite (or) rude," followed by 
"rude" signifying the "correct" descriptor for that 
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particular face. The subject then might see the next face 
followed by two adjectives such as "liar (or) neat," which, 
in turn, would be followed by "neat," the "correct" 
descriptor for that particular face. 
From the sixteen descriptors (eight adjectives and 
their opposites), two different sets of descriptor pairs and 
their correct descriptor were created using all sixteen 
words in both oppositional and nonoppositional contexts. 
For example, half of the subjects were given "polite (or) 
rude" as one pair of descriptors, while the other half were 
given "cold (or) polite" and "honest (or) rude" as 
descriptor pairs (see appendix D for both sets of descriptor 
pairs) . The same descriptors were used in both oppositional 
and nonoppositional contexts to ensure that the words 
themselves were not affecting the outcome. The two list 
were randomly administered to subjects. 
To determine the oppositionality (antonymic) and 
nonoppositionality of the descriptor pairs, the adjectives 
were tested against a thesaurus and ratings from three 
judges who were college students participating in the 
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement 
for their introductory psychology class at Loyola University 
of Chicago. The three judges were given a list of 
oppositional and nonoppositional adjective pairs, including 
the experimental pairs, and asked to rate each pair of 
adjectives and indicate whether they thought that each pair 
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was opposite in meaning. Interrater reliability was 
determined taking the number of times the three judges 
agreed as to the oppositional or nonoppositional nature of 
each adjective pair and dividing that number by the number 
of opportunities to agree. This figure was then multiplied 
by 100 (see Shaughnessy and Zechmeister (1985, p. 60)). The 
interrater reliability for experimental oppositional and 
nonoppositional adjective pairs was 100 percent. 
Scoring and Statistical Analysis 
This experiment is a 2 (sex) X 2 (predicational 
context) mixed model design, with the first variable being 
between subjects and the second variable being within-
subjects. A significant effect for sex was not expected. 
The dependent variables of interest were the trials to 
criterion scores for oppositionality and nonoppositionality. 
The separate scores for oppositionality and 
nonoppositionality were calculated by counting the number of 
trials it took each subject to learn all four of these 
descriptors in a sublist. The criterion we use for 
determining whether a subject had learned the personality 
style for both oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed 
descriptors was two consecutive trials of accurately 
anticipating the "correct" descriptor. The number of trials 
it took each subject to learn all four of oppositionally and 
nonoppositionally framed descriptors constituted the,within-
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lists score for these dependent variables. Thus, subjects 
could have learned the four oppositionally framed 
descriptors in fewer trials than the four nonoppositionally 
framed descriptors or vice versa; or they could have tied, 
learning all eight descriptors in the same number of trials. 
The difference between the oppositional and nonoppositional 
scores constituted the test of our hypothesis for this 
experiment. 
To clarify this scoring procedure, if, for example, a 
subject correctly anticipated all four oppositionally framed 
descriptors in the 5th and 9th trials, reaching criterion on 
the 10th, that subject's oppositional score would be 10. 
This same subject may have correctly anticipated all 
nonoppositionally framed descriptors in the 5th, 9th, 11th 
trials, reaching criterion on the 12th, that subject's 
nonoppositional score would be 12. 
The experimenter was present during the experiment in 
order to record hits and misses for each trial, using a 
trials to criterion grid sheet. To ensure the accuracy of 
recording hits and misses, the learning session for one out 
of every four subjects was audiotaped. There was a total of 
ten audiotaped sessions. Each taped session was then 
compared with its trials to criterion grid sheet for 
recording errors. Of the ten sessions audiotaped, two 
errors were found, both inconsequential to the score of the 
particular subject. (The recording errors were made in early 
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trials in which neither oppositionally or nonoppositionally 
framed descriptors were learned.) Also, the audio recording 
for one session helped clarify a recording mark which had no 
bearing on the score of the subject. Since the audiotaped 
sessions revealed so few recording errors, we can assume 
that the overall recording error rate was minimal and was 
inconsequential to the outcome of the experiment. 
The analysis of the data for this experiment was a 
factorial analysis of variance using the BMDP2V statistical 
program. 
RESULTS 
The hypothesis for this experiment predicted subjects 
will require fewer trials to learn the oppositionally framed 
descriptors than the nonoppositionally framed descriptors. 
In order to test this hypothesis, a two-way analysis of 
variance (sex by predicational context) was performed, 
comparing the number of trials it took each subject to learn 
oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed descriptors. 
The analysis produced a marginally significant main effect 
for oppositionality, F(l, 38)= 3.81, p=.0583. There was not 
a main effect for sex. There was no interaction between sex 
and semantic context. Table 1 contains the means and 
standard deviations for this analysis. Table 2 contains the 
ANOVA source table for this analysis. The complete set of 
raw data for this experiment can be found in appendix E. 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Sex and Trials to 
Criterion Scores 
Male Female 
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Total 
------------------------------------------------------------
oppositional 8.00 9.50 8.83 
(SD) (2.03) (3. 02) (2.53) 
nonoppositional 8.83 9.60 9.25 
(SD) ( 2. 04) (3.23) (2.64) 
total 8.42 9.55 
(SD) (2.04) (3.13) 
Table 2 
Analysis of Variance for Sex and Trials to Criterion Scores 
Source of Variance 
SEX 
ERROR 
OPPOSITION 
SEX/OPPOSITION 
ERROR 
Sum of 
Squares 
25.23 
509.16 
4.23 
2.73 
42.154 
df 
1 
38 
1 
1 
38 
Mean 
Square 
25.23 
13.40 
4.23 
2.73 
1.11 
F p 
1. 88 .1781 
3.81 .0583 
2.46 .1251 
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Conclusion 
since the extant literature on oppositionality, 
summarized in chapter III, establishes a precedent for 
oppositional effects in learning, we can, with some 
confidence (our hypothesis could have employed a one-tailed 
prediction), reject the null hypothesis of "no differences" 
between oppositionality and nonoppositionality. 
A marginally significant effect for oppositionality was 
found in this trials-to-criterion learning task. Chapter V 
will describe and report the results of a similar 
experiment, only this time we will see if oppositionality 
facilitates learning in a one-shot recall learning task. 
CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 was designed to test our hypothesis that 
oppositionality facilitates learning in a trials to 
criterion recall task. Experiment 2 is designed to test the 
hypothesis that oppositionality facilitates learning in a 
one-shot recall task which, again, involved learning 
personality styles. This chapter will describe and report 
the results of that experiment. 
METHOD 
Hypothesis: 
Subjects who are asked to select adjectives describing 
the personality styles of faces will recall more of the 
adjectives when they are initially presented in an 
oppositional rather than a nonoppositional context. 
Rationale: The rationale is essentially the same as in 
experiment 1. If a subject is required to associate a face 
with two personality descriptors such as "dominant or 
submissive," he or she will have a wide-range predication, a 
broadly framed yet intrinsically related and meaningful 
context within which to situate the face. The direct 
oppositional relationship of ''dominant or submissive" lends 
a clearly comparable meaning context to the targeted face. 
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consequently, it should be easier to recall a particular 
meaning that is an extension of an oppositional predication. 
In contrast, when a subject has to associate a face 
with "dominant or impulsive," the meaning of "impulsive" in 
relation to "dominant" will more often than not lack a clear 
relational meaning context to the face because the 
relationship of "dominant" to "impulsive" adds relative 
confusion to the context becasue these meanings do not 
enrich each other. Consequently recalling a meaning that is 
an extension of a nonoppositional context should prove to be 
more difficult. 
Subjects: 
Subjects were male and female college students who 
participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement for their introductory psychology class 
at Loyola University of Chicago. A total of sixty (N=60) 
undergraduate students (23 males, 37 females) participated 
in this experiment. 
Procedures 
The same informed consent procedures were followed as 
in experiment 1 (see Appendix A). Subjects were then given 
specific instruction on how the learning experiment would 
proceed. They were encouraged to ask questions about the 
procedure. Subjects were tested in the same or similar room 
56 
with comparable conditions to help avoid random irrelevances 
in the setting. 
To test our hypothesis we arranged for small groups of 
subjects (3-4 per group) to be shown a series of twelve 
pictures of individual faces flashed on a screen by a 
carousel projector. Following each face, a pair of 
adjectives--six oppositional and six nonoppositional in 
relation to each other--that could describe the personality 
style of the preceding person was shown on the screen (e.g., 
dominant-submissive or dominant-impulsive). Each picture was 
followed by one of these pairs of personality descriptors. 
Each slide (both face and descriptor pair) appeared in ten-
second intervals. 
A subject was told that in this study we were trying to 
find out how easy it was to learn a person's personality 
style or reputation. The subjects were asked to choose one 
of the two adjectives they thought would best fit the 
personality style of the preceding picture and then write 
that adjective down on a sheet of paper provided for them. 
They were then told that later in the experiment they would 
be asked to remember the adjectives they chose. All 
subjects were given a practice trial, using three faces and 
descriptors not included in the experiment proper, to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure. Following the 
practice trial, the subjects were given twelve faces each 
accompanied by either two oppositional or nonoppositional 
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personality descriptors. This was a one-shot learning task. 
After the subjects had completed the trial and had 
written down the twelve descriptors of their choosing, the 
sheets with their chosen descriptors were gathered. The 
subjects were then given another sheet and instructed that 
the same twelve pictures, without the pair of descriptors, 
would be shown to them again in a different order. The 
subjects were asked to write in the blanks provided on the 
sheet the personality styles that they chose for each of the 
faces they were about to be shown. Subjects were instructed 
to fill in as many blanks as they could, and to put an X on 
those blanks in which they could not remember the descriptor 
in order to avoid confusion about where to put which 
descriptor. (This procedure also helped avoid confusion 
later when attempting to score the sheets.) 
After subjects had completed the second trial and had 
filled in the second sheet as completely as possible, the 
sheets were then gathered and paired with the initial sheet 
that the subjects had been given. After the second sheet 
was gathered, each subject was given a written debriefing 
(see Appendix B) concerning the purpose of the experiment. 
When the subjects had finished reading the debriefing, the 
experimenter took time to explain any unanswered questions. 
The experimenter then signed the subjects' verification form 
and they were dismissed. Four subjects were used to pretest 
experimental material and procedures. 
Materials 
As in experiment 1, the pictures used for this 
experiment were taken from a 1960s Purdue University 
yearbook. All twelve slides consisted of black and white 
photographs of Caucasian males. 
The twenty-four descriptors used in this experiment 
(see appendix F} were selected from Anderson's (1968} 
"likableness ratings of 555 personality words'' norms. 
58 
Again, Anderson's norms allowed us to control for positive 
and negative affective association and the level of 
ambiguity in word meaning. The selection process involved 
choosing equal numbers of liked and disliked words that had 
a minimum of ambiguity. Eight of the descriptors chosen 
were among the top 149 most liked words. None of these 
eight words had a score less than 4.29 on a scale that 
ranged from 0-6, a score of 6 being "the most favorable or 
desirable." The other eight descriptors (opposite in meaning 
to the first eight} were chosen from among the bottom 233 
most disliked words. None of these eight words had a 
likableness rating higher than 2.24 on a scale that ranged 
from 0-6, a score of O being "the least favorable or 
desirable." 
Using the twenty-four descriptors (twelve adjectives 
and their opposites}, two different sets of descriptor pairs 
were created using all twenty-four words in both 
oppositional and nonoppositional contexts. For example, 
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half of the subjects were given "polite (or) rude" as one 
pair of descriptors, while the other half were given "polite 
(or) boring" and "sincere (or) rude" as descriptor pairs 
(see appendix G for both sets of descriptor pairs). The 
same descriptors were used in both oppositional and 
nonoppositional contexts to ensure that the words themselves 
were not affecting the outcome. The two lists were randomly 
administered to subjects. 
To determine the oppositionality and nonoppositionality 
of the descriptor pairs, the adjectives were tested against 
a thesaurus and ratings from three judges who were college 
students participating in the experiment in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement for their introductory 
psychology class at Loyola University of Chicago. The three 
judges were given a list of oppositional and nonoppositional 
adjective pairs, including the experimental pairs, and asked 
to rate each pair of adjectives and indicate whether or not 
they thought that each pair was opposite in meaning. 
Interrater reliability was determined taking the number of 
times the three judges agreed as to the oppositional or 
nonoppositional nature of each adjective pair and dividing 
that number by the number of opportunities to agree. This 
figure was then multiplied by 100 (see Shaughnessy and 
Zechmeister [1985, p. 60)). The interrater reliability for 
experimental oppositional and nonoppositional adjective 
pairs was 100 percent. 
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Scoring and Statistical Analysis 
As with experiment 1, this experiment is a 2 (sex) X 2 
(predicational context) mixed model design, with the first 
variable being between subjects and the second variable 
being within-subjects. A significant effect for sex was not 
expected. The dependent variables of interest were the 
scores for oppositionality and nonoppositionality. The 
score for oppositionality was calculated by counting the 
number of correctly recalled descriptors that had been 
originally framed from an oppositional context for each 
subject. The same scoring procedure was used for 
nonoppositionally framed descriptors. For each subject, the 
number of recalled descriptors that had been originally 
framed from a nonoppositional context constituted the score 
for nonoppositionality. Thus, subjects could have recalled 
more oppositionally framed descriptors than 
nonoppositionally framed descriptors, or vice versa; or they 
could have tied, recalling equal numbers of oppositionally 
and nonoppositionally framed descriptors. The mean 
difference between the oppositional and nonoppositional 
scores constituted the test of our hypothesis for this 
experiment. The analysis of the data for this experiment 
was a factorial analysis of variance using the BMDP2V 
statistical program. 
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RESULTS 
The hypothesis for this experiment predicted that 
subjects will recall more of the oppositionally framed 
descriptors than the nonoppositionally framed descriptors. 
The two-way factorial analysis of variance produced a 
significant main effect for predicational context, F(l, 58)= 
5.03, p=.0288. There was no main effect for sex. There was 
no interaction between sex and predicational context. Table 
3 contains the means and standard deviations for this 
analysis. Table 4 contains the ANOVA source table for this 
analysis. The complete set of raw data for this experiment 
can be found in appendix H. 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Sex and Trials to 
. Criterion Scores 
Male Female 
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Total 
-----------------------------------------------------------
oppositional 2.21 2.27 
(SD) (1.35) (1.76} 
nonoppositional 1. 61 1. 81 
(SD) (1.23) (1.17} 
total 1.91 2.04 
(SD} (1.29} (1.46) 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance for Sex and Recall Scores 
Source of Variance 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
2.25 
( 1. 56) 
1. 73 
(1.20) 
F p 
-----------------------------------------------------------
SEX 0.46 1 0.46 .19 .6648 
ERROR 141. 03 58 2.43 
OPPOSITION 8.09 1 8.09 5.03 .0288 
SEX/OPPOSITION 0.16 1 0.16 .10 .7552 
ERROR 93.33 58 1. 61 
conclusion 
Since a significant effect for oppositionality was 
found we can reject the null hypothesis suggesting "no 
differences" between our experimental conditions. 
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Since a marginally significant effect for 
oppositionality was found in the trials to criterion recall 
task (Experiment 1) and an unqualified significant effect 
was found in this one-shot recall task, it seemed plausible 
to us that oppositionality may facilitate learning in yet 
other types of learning tasks which heretofore had not been 
studied. Chapter VI will describe and report the results of 
another experiment designed to extend and test our 
hypothesis that oppositionality facilitates learning. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 1 and 2 were designed to test our hypothesis 
that oppositionality facilitates learning in trials to 
criterion and one-shot recall tasks. Experiment 3 is 
designed to test, again, the hypothesis that oppositionality 
facilitates learning in a trials to criterion learning task 
which involves learning the definitions of difficult words. 
This chapter will describe and report the results of that 
experiment. 
METHOD 
Hypothesis: 
Subjects who are asked to learn the defintions of 
difficult words will require fewer trials to learn these 
definitions when they are presented in an oppositonal rather 
than a nonoppositional context. 
Rationale: The rationale is essentially the same as in 
experiments 1 and 2. If a subject is required to associate 
a difficult word with two possible definitions that are 
antonymically related, such as ''fancy or plain," he or she 
will have a wide-range predication, a broadly framed yet 
intrinsically related and meaningful context within which to 
situate the word. The direct oppositional relationship of 
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"fancy or plain" lends a clearly comparable meaning context 
to the targeted difficult word. Consequently, it should be 
easier to recall a particular meaning that is an extension 
of an oppositional predication. 
In contrast, when a subject has to associate a word 
with "genial or fancy," the meaning of "genial" in relation 
to "fancy" will more often than not lack a clear relational 
meaning context to the difficult word because the 
relationship of "fancy" to "genial" adds relative confusion 
to the context because these meanings do not delimit each 
other. Consequently recalling a meaning that is an 
extension of a nonoppositional context should prove to be 
more difficult. 
Subjects: 
Subjects were male and female college students who 
participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement for their introductory psychology class 
at Loyola University of Chicago. A total of sixty (N=60) 
undergraduate students (17 males, 43 females) participated 
in this experiment. 
Procedures 
The same informed consent procedures were followed as 
in experiment 1 (see Appendix A). After consent forms were 
signed, subjects were then given specific instructions on 
how the learning experiment would proceed. They were 
encouraged to ask questions about the procedure. Subjects 
were tested individually in the same or similar room with 
comparable conditions to help avoid random irrelevances in 
the setting. 
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To test our hypothesis we arranged for each subject to 
be shown, using a standard memory drum, a series of eight 
difficult words. Following each difficult word, a pair of 
one-word definitions appeared in the memory drum window. 
One of the words was a synonym for the difficult word. The 
other word in the pair was either an antonym (opposite in 
meaning) or another word that was neither a synonym or 
antonym. For example, if the difficult word "recherche" 
appeared in the window, a pair of words, either "fancy-
plain" (oppositional) or "genial-fancy" (nonoppositional), 
would next appear in the window. There were four 
oppositional and four nonoppositional definitional pairs in 
each list of eight difficult words. Following each pair of 
either oppositional or nonoppositional definitional pairs, 
the correct definition would appear in the window. In this 
particular example, the word "fancy" would appear in the 
window after "fancy-plain" or "genial-fancy." Each 
difficult word was followed by a pair of definitions and 
then by the correct definition of the two. The words 
(difficult word, single-word definition pairs and the 
correct definition) appeared in the memory drum window at 
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four-second intervals. 
Each subject was told that "In this study we are trying 
to find out how easy it is to learn the meanings of 
difficult words." The subjects were asked to remember the 
correct definitions that accompanied the difficult word. 
All subjects were given a practice trial, using three 
difficult words and their definitional pairs not included in 
the experiment proper, to familiarize themselves with the 
procedure. After the practice trial, and after subjects had 
viewed each difficult word and its accompanying definitions 
to be used in the experiment once (one trial), the subjects 
were instructed to call out, from the second trial and 
thereafter, the correct definition before the pair of 
oppositional or nonoppositional definitions appeared in the 
window. Correctly calling out the proper meaning 
constituted a "hit"; and an incorrect response or no 
response at all constituted a "miss." 
Subjects were informed of their hits and misses, and 
each hit and miss was simultaneously recorded on a trial 
grid sheet for each of the eight faces across trials. 
Subjects completed the experiment by correctly calling out 
all eight definitions twice in a row in two consecutive 
trials. If a subject accurately anticipated the correct 
definition for all the difficult words in a particular trial 
but then missed correctly anticipating at least one 
definition in the following trial, the subject would then 
have to correctly anticipate the definitions for every 
difficult word in the next two trials in order for the 
experiment to stop. 
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After subjects had completed the experiment, they 
were given a written debriefing (see appendix I) concerning 
the purpose of the experiment. When the subjects had 
finished reading the debriefing, the experimenter took time 
to explain any unanswered questions. The experimenter then 
signed the subjects' verification form and they were 
dismissed. Ten subjects were used to pretest experimental 
material and procedures. 
Materials 
The eight difficult words used in this experiment (see 
appendix J) were selected from a dictionary. The one-word 
definitions for each of the eight difficult words were also 
derived from a dictionary. A total of twenty-two words (8 
definitions and their opposites and 8 other words) were 
generated to provide the oppositional and nonoppositional 
meaning context for the difficult words. 
From the twenty-two definitions, two different sets of 
definitional pairs were created. For example, as 
illustrated in the procedure section, for half of the 
subjects the difficult word "recherche," was followed by the 
definitional pair "fancy (or) plain," while for the other 
half "genial (or) fancy," followed "recherche" {see -appendix 
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K for both sets of definitional pairs). The two lists were 
randomly administered to subjects. 
To determine the oppositionality (antonymical) and 
nonoppositionality of the definitional pairs, the meanings 
were tested against a standard thesaurus and ratings from 
three judges who were college students participating in the 
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement 
for their introductory psychology class at Loyola University 
of Chicago. The three judges were given a list of 
oppositional and nonoppositional one-word definition pairs, 
including the experimental pairs, and asked to rate each 
pair of meanings and indicate whether or not they thought 
that each pair was opposite in meaning. Interrater 
reliability was determined taking the number of times the 
three judges agreed as to the oppositional or 
nonoppositional nature of each definitional pair and 
dividing that number by the number of opportunities to 
agree. This figure was then multiplied by 100 (see 
Shaughnessy and Zechmeister [1985, p. 60]). The interrater 
reliability for experimental oppositional and 
nonoppositional definitional pairs was .75. 
Scoring and Statistical Analysis 
Like experiments 1 and 2, this is a 2 (sex) X 2 
(predicational context) mixed model design, with the first 
variable being between subjects and the second variable 
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being within-subjects. A significant effect for sex was not 
expected. The dependent variables of interest were the 
trials to criterion scores for oppositionality and 
nonoppositionality. 
The score for oppositionality was calculated by 
counting the number of trials it took each subject to learn 
all four oppositionally framed definitions. The criterion 
we use for determining whether a subject had learned the 
definition of each difficult word for both oppositionally 
and nonoppositionally framed definitions was two consecutive 
trials of accurately anticipating the correct definition. 
The same scoring procedure was used for nonoppositionality 
framed definitions. The number of trials it took each 
subject to learn all four nonoppositionally framed 
definitions constituted the score for nonoppositionality. 
Thus, subjects could have learned the four oppositionally 
framed meanings in fewer trials than the four 
nonoppositionally framed meanings, or vice versa; or they 
could have tied, learning all eight definitions in the same 
number of trials. The difference between the oppositional 
and nonoppositional scores constituted the test of our hypo-
thesis for this experiment. 
To clarify this scoring procedure, if, for example, a 
subject correctly anticipated all four oppositionally framed 
definitions in the 5th and 9th trials, reaching criterion on 
the 10th, that subject's oppositional score would be" 10. 
This same subject may have correctly anticipated all 
nonoppositionally framed definitions in the 5th, 9th, 11th 
trials, reaching criterion on the 12th, that subject's 
nonoppositional score would be 12. 
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The experimenter recorded the hits and misses for each 
trial, using a trials to criterion grid sheet. since the 
audiotaped recordings for experiment 1 revealed that the 
hits and misses recording procedure was virtually errorless, 
we did not tape any of the learning sessions for this 
experiment. The analysis of the data for this experiment 
was a factorial analysis of variance using the BMDP2V 
statistical program. 
RESULTS 
The hypothesis for this experiment predicted subjects 
will require fewer trials to learn the oppositionally framed 
definitions than the nonoppositionally framed definitions. 
The two-way factorial analysis of variance did not produce a 
significant effect for predicational context, F(1, 58)=1.86, 
p=.1783. There was no main effect for sex. Table 5 
contains the means and standard deviations for this 
analysis. Table 6 contains the ANOVA source table for this 
analysis. The complete set of raw data for this experiment 
can be found in appendix L. 
Table 5 
Means and standard Deviations for Sex and Trials to 
Criterion Scores 
Male Female 
opposition 8.06 8.12 
(SD) (2.49) (2.94) 
nonoppositional 8.59 8.42 
(SD) (2.72) (3.58) 
total 8.32 8.27 
(SD) (2.61) (3.26) 
Table 6 
Analysis of Variance for Sex and Recall Scores 
Source of Variance 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F 
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Total 
8.10 
(2.72) 
8.47 
( 3 • 15) 
p 
-----------------------------------------------------------
SEX 0.08 1 0.08 .oo .9467 
ERROR 986.29 58 17.01 
OPPOSITION 4.21 1 4.21 1. 86 .1783 
SEX/OPPOSITION 0.31 1 0.31 .14 • 7112 
ERROR 131. 65 58 2.27 
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While the mean difference of scores for this experiment 
did favor oppositionality (albeit nonsignificantly), the 
above results were somewhat surprising since, at face-value, 
the raw data scores revealed that considerably more subjects 
learned the oppositionally framed words faster than subjects 
who learned nonoppositionally framed words faster. Of the 
60 subjects, 31 (52%) learned the oppositionally framed 
words faster; 14 {23%) learned the nonoppositionally framed 
words faster; and, 15 (25%) tied, learning both 
oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed words in the 
same number of trials. 
Because there was a mean difference in performance and 
it appears that an inordinate number of subjects learned the 
oppositionally framed words faster, we have grounds for 
conducting a post hoc chi-square statistical analysis to 
determine if the inordinate number of subjects learning the 
oppositionally framed words faster is significantly 
different from the number of subjects who either learned the 
nonoppositionally framed words faster or tied. 
For the analysis, we simply grouped subjects according 
to whether they learned 1) the oppositionally framed words 
faster {OPP), 2) the nonoppositionally framed words faster 
{NON), or 3) the oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed 
words in the same number of trials (TIE) . Since there were 
three possible outcomes, the expected number of subjects for 
each group was 20 (see table 7). The chi-square analysis 
revealed that a significant number (X =9.10, df=2, p<.025) 
of subjects learned the oppositionally framed words faster 
than those who learned the nonoppositionally framed words 
faster or tied. 
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Table 7 
Chi-square Analysis Expected and Observed Outcomes Diagram 
.for Experiment 3 
OPP NON TIE 
Expected 20 20 20 
Observed 31 14 15 
( 52%) (23%) (25%) 
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Conclusion 
Since the factorial analysis of variance did not yield 
a significant effect for predicational context, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis of ''no differences" 
between experimental conditions. However, the post hoc chi-
square analysis does suggest that oppositionality is 
affecting learning for a significant number of subjects. In 
Chapter VII we will discuss the results and implications of 
those results for all three experiments. 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The present research has sought to empirically test and 
extend the application of oppositionality, an important 
construct of LLT, to learning tasks heretofore not studied. 
we sought to test whether or not oppositionality can 
facilitate learning as it applies to learning personality 
styles of faces and difficult words. In doing so we have 
taken seriously the notion that meaning is oppositional. 
While the majority of learning theories rely on a 
mediational model of learning, our interest was to 
demonstrate that human beings, in actuality, learn by means 
of predicational process in which meaning is framed 
oppositionally. Since oppositionality is fundamental to the 
predicational process, it stands to reason that if people 
are given a learning task in which they are able to learn 
target items from both an oppositional or nonoppositional 
context, a targeted item framed from an oppositional context 
should prove to be easier to learn than an item framed from 
a nonoppositional context. 
In Experiment 1 we hypothesized that subjects will take 
fewer trials to learn personality descriptors they have 
framed oppositionally than those descriptors they framed 
nonoppositionally. We found a marginally significant main 
effect in favor of oppositionality. The fact that an effect 
for oppositionality was only marginally significant may be 
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due to our procedure for this experiment. After having 
subjects view the faces, the pairs of descriptors (either 
oppositional or nonoppositional) in the second flash, and 
then the "correct" adjectives in the third flash in the 
first trial, we asked subjects to call out the "correct" 
descriptor before the second flash in each subsequent trial. 
There is the possibility that subjects did not attend to or 
consider the pair of descriptors in the second flash because 
they knew that the "correct" descriptor would immediately 
follow in the third flash. So essentially after the first 
trial, some subjects may have only attended to the faces and 
the correct descriptor for each face, effectively preventing 
them from framing the faces in either an oppositionally or 
nonoppositional predicational context. If this was indeed 
the case then we have no theoretical grounds upon which to 
predict that subjects would learn the personality style of 
some faces rather than others, and even a marginally 
significant effect for oppositionality would be surprising. 
It is likely that some subjects did consider the 
oppositional and nonoppositional context of the second flash 
at least in a number of trials and other subjects rarely 
considered the context of the second flash; hence, the 
watered down effect for oppositionality. 
Our insistence that oppositionality did facilitate 
learning in Experiment 1, albeit in a less than ideal 
fashion, is justified since Experiment 2 clearly 
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demonstrates that oppositionality does facilitate learning 
personality styles. We modified the design of experiment 2 
so that subjects would have to consider carefully the 
predicational context by only giving them the faces in the 
first flash and the oppositional or nonoppositional 
descriptors in second flash and then asking them to select 
one of the two descriptors they thought fit the preceding 
face. This procedure required subjects to utilize the 
predicational context and allowed us to test, unambiguously 
and without reservation, whether or not subjects could 
recall more self-selected descriptors that were framed 
oppositionally. The results using this procedure yielded a 
significant effect for oppositionality. It is clear that 
when subjects are required to carefully consider and perhaps 
actively and personally contribute to the predicational 
process by selecting from either oppositional or 
nonoppositional descriptors, they recall significantly more 
descriptors that are framed oppositionally than those that 
are framed nonoppositionally. 
Since LLT claims that oppositionality is fundamental to 
all forms of learning (see Rychlak, 1988a, Rychlak and 
Slife, 1984), the results of experiment 3, in which we asked 
subjects to learn the definition of difficult words, should 
have shown that oppositionality facilitates learning. Even 
though the mean variance between oppositionally and 
nonoppositionally framed definitions favored 
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oppositionality, the analysis of variance for this 
experiment did not yield a main effect for predicational 
context. In light of the procedural problems associated 
with experiment 1 discussed above, we should not be 
surprised to find no effect for oppositionality since the 
procedure for experiment 3 was identical to experiment 1, 
only in experiment 3 subjects were asked to learn the 
definitions of difficult words rather personality styles of 
faces. Again, subjects could have easily ignored the 
predicational context (oppositional or nonoppositional) 
provided in the second flash and simply concentrated on the 
difficult word and its correct definition which followed the 
predicational context for each difficult words in every 
trial. 
There is, however, evidence that oppositionality did, 
in fact, facilitate learning in this experiment as suggested 
by the post hoc chi-square analysis. That analysis found 
that a significant number of subjects (51%) actually learned 
more readily oppositionally framed definitions than subjects 
who tied (25%) or learned nonoppositionally framed 
definitions more readily (24%). Since for a significant 
proportion of the subjects the oppositional context 
facilitated learning, it can be argue that this 
nonparametric discrepancy is due to the fact that some 
subjects, more than others, were actually taking into 
consideration the predicational context. 
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In addition, there appears to be a list difference for 
subjects receiving lists 1 and 2. While 13 of the 30 
subjects who received list 1 learned the nonoppositionally 
framed definitions more readily, only 1 out of the 30 
subjects who received list 2 learned the nonoppositionally 
framed definitions more readily {See appendices Kand L). 
It is possible that some difficult words were, regardless of 
the predicational context, simply easier to learn, or some 
other unforeseen (and, hence, uncontrolled) variable 
influenced the difference in outcomes for the two lists. 
At any rate, had all subjects taken seriously the 
predicational context, the parametric results should have 
shown a significant result for oppositionality as was the 
case in experiment 2. 
Since logical learning theory maintains that it is the 
individual person who frames meaning oppositionally and not 
some universally law exogenous to the person, the 
nonparametric analysis which took into consideration the 
outcome of each individual subject should be considered a 
legitimate way to test the effect of oppositionality. 
Nevertheless, one could revise the procedures for both 
experiment 1 and 3 in such way that subjects would have to 
more earnestly consider the oppositional and nonoppositional 
context. For example, one could change the procedure so 
that both experiments become recognition tasks. Instead of 
asking subjects to call out the correct descriptor or 
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definition before the oppositional or nonoppositional 
context appears (in the second flash), we could ask subjects 
to decide, after the second flash, which one of the two 
descriptors or definitions is the correct one. The third 
flash would then signify to the subject whether or not he or 
she recognized the correct descriptor or definition. since 
following this procedure would require subject be attentive 
to the predicational context, we would, again, hypothesize 
that subjects will learn the oppositionally framed 
descriptors and definition more readily than the 
nonoppositionally framed descriptors and definitions. 
Be that as it may, the three experiments described in 
this thesis, when taken together, do support LLT's claim 
that oppositionality or dialectical thinking is important to 
the learning process. In and of themselves, of course, they 
do not demonstrate the breath and depth of oppositionality 
as outlined by LLT, but they do provide an useful 
operationalization of oppositionality that can be 
empirically validated. Judging by the outcomes of these 
three experiments, we strongly recommend that future 
research dealing with oppositionality include experimental 
designs that require subjects to attend to and actively 
contribute to the learning process. 
In conclusion, we argued in chapter II that a learning 
theory must take into account the agentive nature of human 
activity since, in some sense, we generally take our" 
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thoughts and actions and the thoughts and actions of others 
to be meaningful and not simply effected by efficiently 
caused necessity; it should be abundantly clear that a 
mediational model of learning fails to render human activity 
meaningful. We have also argued that the oppositional or 
dialectical nature of human cognition and behavior has a 
long and thoroughly demonstrable tradition in philosophy and 
history. We have also described a sizable amount of 
research in learning that illustrates the oppositional or 
dialectical nature of the learning process, even though it 
is not always identified by its researchers as such. 
Rychlak's LLT has set forth a theory of learning that 
takes into account both the oppositional nature of mentation 
and the agentive quality of human activity. The research 
for this thesis has offered empirical support for tenets of 
that theory. Since LLT represents an alternative to the 
many mechanistic theories which either explicitly or 
implicitly adhere to a mediational model of learning, 
continuing to gather empirical support for it may prove to 
be one of the most fruitful lines of research for 
psychologists as they attempt to understand human beings. 
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APPENDIX A 
Consent Form 
Date: 
Dear Friend: 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this 
research project. 
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Please know that all of the information that we collect 
today is confidential. This means that it will be seen only 
by myself and other qualified researchers and will be used 
for research purposes alone. 
You need not use your own name on the experimental 
sheets. You can substitute a number (in certain cases we 
will do this for you) . Rest assured that any data we gather 
here today is entirely anonymous. No one will ever know 
what you specifically achieved or conveyed here today. 
Finally, should you decide at any point to discontinue 
your participation in this project, for whatever reason, 
please feel free to do so. Though we do not expect that 
this will happen, we want you to know that you are free to 
leave the study at any point without incurring any kind of 
penalty. 
Please feel free to ask any questions. Once again, 
thank you for participating in this research. 
Sincerely, 
I have read the above and understand it completely. 
~~Signature 
Date 
Today's 
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APPENDIX B 
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DEBRIEFING: Learning Personality Styles 
In this study we are investigating whether you can 
learn more readily the personality style of a person 
(picture of a person) if given two opposing adjectives to 
choose from rather than two nonopposing adjectives. Since 
previous research has shown that when people are presented 
with opposite meanings they are better able to remember 
those meanings, we wanted to see if the same was true when 
one is learning personality styles of someone else. To see 
if you are, in fact, better able recall opposite meanings 
than nonopposite meanings, we simply compared your ability 
to call out the correct descriptor associated with a 
particular face and whether that descriptor had initially 
included opposite or nonopposite meanings. 
This research is based on the work of Professor Joseph 
F. Rychlak of our psychology department. If you would like 
to discuss any of this with him or the person conducting 
this study, they would be happy to arrange an appointment 
with you. 
Thank you very much for being a participant in the study. 
PLEASE LEAVE THIS SHEET ON YOUR DESK 
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APPENDIX C 
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Sixteen descriptors for Experiment 1 
01. warm 
02. cold 
03. sincere 
04. phony 
05. sloppy 
06. neat 
07. kind 
08. cruel 
09. honest 
10. liar 
11. boring 
12. interesting 
13. polite 
14. rude 
15. unreliable 
16. dependable 
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APPENDIX D 
Lists of Descriptor Sets for Experiment 1 
List 1 
1. polite/rude=rude 
2. interesting/cruel=cruel 
3. unreliable/kind=kind 
4. liar/honest=honest 
5. sincere/boring=sincere 
6. sloppy/neat=sloppy 
7. cold/warm=warm 
s. phony/dependable=phony 
List 2 
1. cold/polite=polite 
2. interesting/boring=boring 
3. kind/cruel=kind 
4. liar/neat=liar 
5. phony/sincere=sincere 
6. warm/sloppy=sloppy 
7. honest/rude=honest 
8. unreliable/dependable= 
unreliable 
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APPENDIX E 
Raw Data Scores for Experiment 1 
Subject Q N M/F 
1. 07 09 F 
2. 11 11 F 
3. 09 10 F 
4. 07 08 M 
5. 07 08 F 
6. 06 05 F 
7. 06 06 M 
8. 06 08 M 
9. 18 20 F 
10. 10 11 F 
11. 06 06 M 
12. 13 11 F 
13. 06 08 M 
14. 06 09 F 
15. 11 13 M 
16. 09 11 M 
17. 09 10 M 
18. 05 06 M 
19. 08 10 M 
20. 05 06 F 
O=Oppositional Score 
N=Nonoppositional Score 
M\F=Male or Female 
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Subject Q N M/F 
21. 11 11 F 
22. 09 08 F 
23. 11 10 M 
24. 11 08 F 
25. 09 13 F 
26. 10 09 M 
27. 10 09 M 
28. 09 07 F 
29. 10 10 F 
30. 08 08 F 
31. 05 06 M 
32. 09 09 M 
33. 12 12 F 
34. 10 12 M 
35. 13 11 F 
36. 10 09 F 
37. 05 04 F 
38. 07 09 M 
39. 10 10 F 
20. 09 09 M 
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APPENDIX F 
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Twenty-four descriptors for Experiment 2 
01. selfish 
02. generous 
03. sincere 
04. phony 
05. sloppy 
06. neat 
07. pleasant 
08. obnoxious 
09. honest 
10. liar 
11. boring 
12. interesting 
13. polite 
14. rude 
15. unreliable 
16. dependable 
17. friendly 
18. hostile 
19. sad 
20. happy 
21. unfaithful 
22. loyal 
23. sociable 
24. shy 
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APPENDIX G 
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Lists of Descriptor Sets for Experiment 2 
List 1 List 2 
01. interesting/boring 01. interesting/phony 
02. happy/unfaithful 02. happy/sad 
03. selfish/sociable 03. selfish/generous 
04. loyal/sad 04. loyal/unfaithful 
05. unreliable/dependable 05. unreliable/honest 
06. liar/honest 06. liar/neat 
07. shy/pleasant 07. shy/sociable 
08. hostile/thoughtful 08. hostile/friendly 
09. generous/obnoxious 09. pleasant/obnoxious 
10. polite/rude 10. polite/boring 
11. phony/sincere 11. sincere/rude 
12. sloppy/neat 12. sloppy/dependable 
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APPENDIX H 
Raw Data Scores for Experiment 2 
Subject Q N M/F 
1. 3 3 M 
2. 4 2 F 
3. 3 0 M 
4. 5 2 F 
5. 2 2 F 
6. 3 4 F 
7. 2 1 F 
8. 3 2 M 
9. 1 2 F 
10. 0 0 M 
11. 5 1 F 
12. 3 1 F 
13. 2 0 F 
14. 2 1 F 
15. 5 3 M 
16. 4 4 M 
17. 2 0 M 
18. 4 4 F 
19. 3 1 M 
20. 2 1 M 
21. 5 2 M 
22. 4 1 F 
23. 5 1 F 
24. 2 1 M 
25. 4 1 F 
26. 5 2 F 
27. 4 2 F 
28. 2 2 F 
29. 4 1 F 
30. 3 2 M 
O=Oppositional Score 
N=Nonoppositional Score 
M\F=Male or Female 
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Subject Q N M/F 
31. 2 1 M 
32. 1 1 F 
33. 0 1 F 
34. 2 4 M 
35. 2 3 M 
36. 2 1 F 
37. 0 1 F 
38. 4 2 F 
39. 4 3 F 
40. 1 0 M 
41. 0 3 F 
42. 4 5 F 
43. 3 1 M 
44. 2 2 F 
45. 0 1 F 
46. 0 1 F 
47. 1 2 F 
48. 1 2 M 
49. 1 2 F 
50. 0 2 M 
51. 0 0 F 
52. 1 0 M 
53. 2 2 F 
54. 0 5 F 
55. 0 1 F 
56. 2 2 F 
57. 1 2 M 
58. 0 2 M 
59. 2 1 M 
60. 1 2 M 
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DEBRIEFING: Learning Difficult Words 
In this study we were testing whether oppositionality 
is more likely to facilitate learning than 
nonoppositionality. Some of the words you had to learn were 
defined for you in an oppositional context during the second 
presentation of words. Others were defined in a 
nonoppositional context. 
It is our hypothesis that when you learn something in 
an oppositional context, since both ends of the opposition 
are important to the meaning of the word you are learning, 
you have more information to work with than when you are 
trying to learn something in a nonoppositional context. 
This is not a simple idea. For example, we might argue 
that if you are given opposite words (on the second 
presentation) defining the word you are targeted to learn, 
you could become confused by these overlapping meanings and 
actually do worse than if you had nonoppositional words to 
work with. 
This research is based on the work of Professor Joseph 
F. Rychlak of our psychology department. If you would like 
to discuss any of this with him or the experimenter, they 
would be happy to arrange an appointment with you. 
Thank you very much for being a participant in this 
study. If you care to write any comments on this study, as 
it applied to you, please use the reverse side of this 
sheet. 
PLEASE LEAVE THIS SHEET ON YOUR DESK WHEN YOU LEAVE 
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Eight Difficult Words for Experiment 3 
1. prolix 
2. recherche 
3. nugatory 
4. apodictic 
5. arnphibolous 
6. protean 
7. jejune 
8. anodyne 
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Lists of Definitional Pairs for Experiment 3 
List 1 
Anodyne 
1. soothing/helpful=soothing 
Jejune 
2. interesting/dull=dull 
Protean 
3. elderly/changing=changing 
Prolix 
4. wordy/brief=wordy 
Amphibolous 
5. doubtful/merciless=doubtful 
Nugatory 
6. worthless/distressful= 
worthless 
Apodictic 
7. questionable/certain= 
certain 
Recherche 
8. plain/fancy=fancy 
List 2 
Anodyne 
1. tension/soothing=soothing 
Jejune 
2. dull/merciless=dull 
Protean 
3. changing/rigid=changing 
Prolix 
4. weak/wordy=wordy 
Amphibolous 
5. confident/doubtful=doubtful 
Nugatory 
6. valuable/worthless= 
worthless 
Apodictic 
7. certain/helpful=certain 
Recherche 
8. plain/fancy=fancy 
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APPENDIX L 
Raw Data Scores for Experiment 3 
Subject Q N M/F 
1. 12 11 M 
2. 11 09 F 
3. 09 09 F 
4. 11 09 F 
5. 10 07 F 
6. 09 10 F 
7. 06 08 M 
8. 10 10 F 
9. 11 12 F 
10. 06 02 F 
11. 09 06 M 
12. 07 08 M 
13. 06 07 M 
14. 12 08 F 
15. 09 07 M 
16. 08 05 F 
17. 11 12 F 
18. 08 04 F 
19. 05 06 F 
20. 08 06 F 
21. 04 04 F 
22. 10 10 F 
23. 03 04 F 
24. 07 07 F 
25. 11 12 F 
26. 07 09 M 
27. 07 04 F 
28. 06 07 F 
29. 04 05 M 
30. 10 06 F 
O=Oppositional Score 
N=Nonoppositional Score 
M\F=Male or Female 
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Subject Q N M/F 
31. 09 10 M 
32. 07 07 F 
33. 10 10 M 
34. 07 09 F 
35. 08 15 F 
36. 07 07 F 
37. 05 07 F 
38. 05 06 F 
39. 10 10 M 
40. 08 08 M 
41. 09 09 F 
42. 14 16 F 
43. 14 14 F 
44. 08 12 M 
45. 09 05 M 
46. 07 09 F 
47. 13 15 M 
48. 07 08 F 
49. 04 04 F 
50. 04 05 F 
51. 06 10 M 
52. 09 11 F 
53. 04 05 M 
54. 07 07 F 
55. 09 10 F 
56. 03 04 F 
57. 08 08 F 
58. 08 10 F 
59. 04 07 F 
60. 14 18 F 
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